BODY, SELF, AND LANDSCAPE

A Geophilosophical Inquiry into the Place-World
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It was to satisfy man's curiosity concerning the differences of the world from place to place that geography developed as a subject of popular interest.

— Richard Hartshorne, Perspectives on the Nature of Geography

Rather than immersion in the locality where we now live, our mind and emotion are ever ready to shift to other localities and times.

— Yi-Fu Tuan, Cosmos and Hearth

Setting the Scene of Place

There has been a remarkable convergence between geography and philosophy in the past two decades. It is almost as if Strabo's opening claim in his Geographia had finally become justified two millennia later: "The science of Geography, which I now propose to investigate, is, I think, quite as much as any other science, a concern of the philosopher." What is new (and not in Strabo) is the growing conviction that philosophy is the concern of the geographer as well, or more exactly that philosophy and geography now need each other—especially when it comes to matters of place and space. This has been evident ever since the appearance of Yi-Fu Tuan's Space and Place just over twenty years ago. This book was epoch-making because of its stress on the experiential features of place, its "subjective" or "lived" aspects. Other pioneers of place include Edward Relph, Anne Buttimer, Edward W. Soja, and J. Nicholas Entrikin. Each of these geographers, influenced and inspired by Tuan's inaugural work, is committed to the view that a primary task of contemporary geography is to render justice to its place-based character. So much is this the case that Robert David Sack, another leading figure in this place-work, can claim unhesitatingly in his recent book Homo Geographicus that "in geography] the truly important factor is place and its relationship to space."

What is worrisome, however, in Sack's otherwise exemplary treatment of place is precisely its uneasy alliance with space: as is found, for example, in his assertion that the "very fact that place combines the unconstructed physical space in conjunction with social rules and meaning enables place to draw to-
gether the three realms, and makes place constitutive of ourselves as agents,\textsuperscript{3} as if space were simply there, like some kind of matériel, to be made into places. More problematic yet is Sack's claim that space is "coterminal with nature"\textsuperscript{4} — an apparent reinstatement of the Cartesian view that reflects the modernist faith in the primacy of space, a primacy that Sack endorses in unguarded moments, as when he remarks that "I personally would think of nature as the most basic category, and thus would say that space is primary to place."\textsuperscript{5} Even if it is true (as Sack says plausibly) that "we must transform space into places for us to exist," the logic of this very same claim imputes to space an unquestioned priority, as does the related statement that "all of the places we experience are in this universal physical space."\textsuperscript{6}

I go to the trouble of pointing so quickly to Sack's Cartesian clay feet not in order to cavel at what is clearly a major new work but to indicate that struggling out from under the Colossus of Descartes (and other proponents of the priority of space over place) continues to be extremely difficult, even after three centuries of philosophical critique as well as two decades of assiduous efforts on the part of geographers to restore place to a position of central significance. We are no longer in the position of Archytas, who could proclaim unequivocally that place is "the first of all things."\textsuperscript{7} He could say this without any shadow of doubt because in the ancient Greek world place had no competition from space; indeed, there was no conception of space as a ubiquitous medium that is coextensive with the natural world. Times have changed — times in which the relationship between place and space has become a most vexatious matter. In fact, the entire debate between modernism and postmodernism can be expressed in terms of this still unresolved relationship — the modernist insisting on the priority of space (whether in the form of well-ordered physical space or highly structured institutional space) and the postmodernist conversely maintaining the primacy of place and, in particular, lived place.\textsuperscript{8}

My own view is that space and place are two different orders of reality between which no simple or direct comparisons are possible. If this is so, then we should not seek compromises of the sort to which both Descartes and Sack are so prone: Descartes dubs volumetric space "internal place," thereby confounding one kind of space with place, just as Sack's idea of "secondary place" is in effect a commixture of space and place.\textsuperscript{9} Nor can we justifiably affirm that place somehow derives from space: that it is dependent on it and shaped by it, as on the widely held assumption that "All people undertake to change amorphous space into articulated geography."\textsuperscript{10}

I maintain that "space" is the name for that most encompassing reality that allows for things to be located within it; and it serves in this locatory capacity whether it is conceived as absolute or relative in its own nature. "Place," on the other hand, is the immediate ambiance of my lived body and its history, including the whole sedimented history of cultural and social influences and personal interests that compose my life-history. Place is situated in physical
space, but then so is everything else, events as well as material things; it has no privileged relationship to that space, either by way of exemplification or representation. Nor can it be derived from it by some supposed genealogy. To believe in such a genealogy is to buy into the modernist myth that the universe is made of pure extended space and that anything less than such infinite space, including place, follows from it by condensation or delimitation.

Thus even as we celebrate the turn to place in recent geographical theory—a turn whose single most eloquent and intrepid investigator is Yi-Fu Tuan—we must conceive of place in such a way that it can be disentangled, once and for all, from false assimilations to space.**

**Self, Body, Landscape**

In the remainder of this essay I shall consider several matters that have been of special concern to the person honored in this volume: self, body, and landscape. Each of these notions addresses a different dimension of place. The self has to do with the agency and identity of the geographical subject; body is what links this self to lived place in its sensible and perceptible features; and landscape is the presented layout of a set of places, their sensuous self-presentation as it were.

Western philosophical theories of human selfhood have for the most part tended to tie it to awareness—hence to consciousness. A paradigm instance is Locke’s view that the self’s “personal identity” is entirely a function of the scope of its consciousness of its own past by means of memory. “Since consciousness,” writes Locke, “always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, … in this alone consists personal identity … as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now [as] it was then.”** For Locke, personal identity is a matter of linking up one’s present consciousness with a past consciousness and has nothing whatever to do with place. Place figures only as a parameter of the sheer physical identity of something that has no consciousness whatsoever.***

The quintessential modernist view of the relation between place and self is thus that there is no such relation. Place belongs entirely to the physical world, the self to the realm of consciousness, and the twain supposedly never meet. Locke’s Essay, published in 1690, keeps personal identity and place as far apart as mind and matter in Descartes’s writings fifty years earlier in the same century.

It is a mark of late modern or postmodern thought to contest the dichotomies that hold the self apart from body and place. Contra Descartes, the body is recognized as integral to selfhood, with the result that we can no longer distinguish neatly between physical and personal identity. Against Locke, place is regarded as constitutive of one’s sense of self: “place and self help construct and acti-
vate each other.”¹⁴ Places require human agents to become “primary places” in Sack’s nomenclature, and these same agents require specific places if they are to be the selves they are in the process of becoming. Personal identity is no longer a matter of sheer self-consciousness but now involves intrinsically an awareness of one’s place—a specifically geographical awareness.¹⁵

Any effort to assess the relationship between self and place should point not just to reciprocal influence (that much any ecologically sensitive account would maintain) but, more radically, to constitutive co-ingredience; each is essential to the being of the other. In effect, there is no place without self; and no self without place. What is needed is a model whereby the abstract truth of Sack’s position—which is emblematic of many philosophically minded geographers writing today—can be given concrete articulation, without conflating place and self or maintaining the self as an inner citadel of unimplaced freedom. Just how, then, is place constitutive of the self? How does it insinuate itself into the very heart of personal identity?

**Thinned-out Places**

To answer difficult questions such as these, it is best to begin with what Heidegger calls the “deficient mode” of any given phenomenon—in this case, the scattered self of postmodern society. Let us grant that this deeply distracted self is correlated with the disarray of place—with what Sack calls the “thinned-out places” of our time. Moreover, as places become more attenuated in their hold upon us, they merge into an indifferent state that is reminiscent of nothing so much as space: the very thing that dominated the early modern period from which we are reputedly escaping. Nowadays, emphasizes Sack, “places become thinned out and merge with space.”¹⁶ It is a matter of what has been called “glocalization,” whereby a given locale is linked indifferently to every (or any) other place in global space.¹⁷ This is the converse of the premodern situation in which, as Heidegger remarks, “Bare space is still veiled over. Space has [already] been split up into places.”¹⁸ What does this implicit narrative of the fate of place from premodern to postmodern times tell us about the relation between place and self?

At the very least, it tells us that certain habitual patterns of relating to place have become weakened to the point of disappearing altogether. I refer to the micropractices that tie the geographical subject to his or her place-world, one instance of which is the “work-world” (Werkwelt) that is Heidegger’s focus in his celebrated discussion of ready-to-hand things in Being and Time. In this discussion, place and self are intimately interlocked in the world of practical work. Tools not only are literal “instruments” that have a functional purpose of their own—for example, a hammer to drive in nails—but create works or products that allude to the person who will make use of them: “the work is cut to [the consumer’s] figure; he ‘is’ there along with it as the work emerges.”¹⁹
Not just the abstract figure of the consumer, however, but the concrete form of the laboring self is at stake in the work-world. When Heidegger remarks that “our concernful absorption in whatever work-world lies closest to us has a function of discovering,” he means that this absorption helps us to become aware of our own being-in-the-world and not just the external destination of what we create in the workplace. It helps us to actualize our “pre-ontological understanding of the world,” that is, to grasp the particular place we are in as the particular person which we are.

Heidegger is telling us that in a comparatively demanding place such as a workshop, the human beings who labor there are so deeply embroiled that their being-in-the-world, their very self, is part of the scene and not something that hovers above it at a transcendental remove. The purpose of the tools we employ is not exhausted in sheer production or an economic fate outside the workplace but is also closely geared into the circuit of selfhood, indeed into its ultimate “care-structure.” In such a circumstance, then, place and self are thoroughly enmeshed — without, however, being fused into each other in a single monolithic whole. The articulations Heidegger finds in the situation, including the “towards-which” of serviceability, the “for-which” of usability, and the various “assignments” or references that are part of the work-world, indicate that the place/self relation is here as highly ramified as it is intimate.

It would follow that thinned-out places are those in which the densely enmeshed infrastructures of the kind Heidegger discerns are missing. Not only do such places not contain strictly, as on Aristotle’s model; they do not even bold, lacking the rigor and substance of thickly lived places. Their very surface is attenuated, being open to continual reshaping and reconnecting with other surfaces. Think of the way in which programs on television or items on the Internet melt away into each other as we switch channels or surf at leisure. In such circumstances, there is a notable lability of place that corresponds to a fickle self who seeks to be entertained: the “aesthetic self” as Kierkegaard would call it. The collapse of the kind of place that is capable of keeping something within it — for example, by its containing surface, such as the stable “surrounder” (periechon) of the Aristotelian model of place — correlates with a self of infinite distractibility whose own surface is continually complicated by new pleasures: in short, a self that has become (in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s arresting term) a “desiring machine.”

Not that all is lost. Not even in postmodernity. As M. Merleau-Ponty said trenchantly, “no one is saved and no one is totally lost.” The point applies to place as well as to the self. Places (if they are to remain places at all) can never become utterly thinned out; they may become increasingly uniform and unable to engage our concernful absorption, yet without ceasing to exist altogether as places for us. In particular, they will not “merge with,” much less turn into, space, as Sack claims: this claim, or fear, confuses two orders of being that are strictly separate.
The same is true of the self, which can certainly become more superficial, yet will always retain traces of integral selfhood — even under the direst of diremptions. Thinned-out places of the sort with which we are surrounded today put the self to the test, tempting it to mimic the tenuous, thinned-out character by becoming itself an indecisive entity incapable of the kind of resolute action that is required in a determinately structured place like a workshop. But the self is not only enfeebled by nonrobust places; it can also make a virtue of the circumstance by becoming more sensitive to differences between places, for example, by leaving one's attenuated natal place in order to appreciate and savor other places and peoples. This is the ambiguous moral of Tuan's sagacious *Cosmos and Hearth: the skeptical cosmopolite, for all his or her unsettledness, learns much more about the larger world and becomes more reflective than does the person who refuses to leave the hearth.*

At stake here is what we might call “the compensatory logic of loss.” All too often, we presume a different logic is at work when it comes to matters of place and self — a logic of what Freud calls the “complementary series,” whereby the more of one thing, the less of the other with which it is paired. Thus, it might be thought that the stronger the self becomes — the more autonomous, self-directive, and so on — the less important place should be. Should not a stronger self be less reliant on particular places? And by the same token, should not a stronger link to a given place — for example, a hearth — bring with it a weaker self, a self that is so able to count on the security of home as to have no “mind of its own,” much less be capable of thinking [in] the reflective, ironic, quizzical mode?

But I believe that rather than a logic of more from less (and, equally, less from more) what we often find in the place/self relationship is a logic of more *with more.* The more places are thinned-out, the *more, not the less,* may selves be led to seek out thick places in which their own personal enrichment can flourish. Two brief examples: (1) The proliferation of movies on video (and now on Dvd) — a decisive step toward the thinness of virtual space — has not meant the end of actual movie theaters but has even managed to increase the attractiveness of such theaters as real places with their own sensuous density and social interest. (2) The remarkable success of online superstores such as Amazon.com — an enterprise that unabashedly advertises itself as the “Earth's biggest bookstore” — has certainly been deeply problematic for many small local bookstores. But such rapid growth has also accompanied and paralleled the equally remarkable success of large bookstores like Borders that have become congenial places in which to browse and read and drink coffee. More has meant not just less — but also more. Place, actual place, is here strengthened and not only diminished by the challenge posed by virtual place.

By this compensatory logic, the self stands to gain as well. For it is now able to move between virtual and actual places with a leeway that, even if not exhibiting the absolute freedom dreamed of in modernism, embodies that mod-
icum of choice that is necessary (if not sufficient) to account for the relationship between self and place. The compensatory model allows us to imagine that both self and place may prosper in the very desert of the postmodern world, that gain may accompany loss: the experience of each being enhanced, rather than simply undermined, in the wasteland of thinned-out places.

**Habitus in the Middle**

Whether this quasi-meliorist reading of our present predicament will prove to be right, no one can claim to know for sure. But we can make progress of a more certain sort if we are able to answer the quite basic question: What ties place and self together? What ensures that these terms are genuinely co-constitutive and not merely diremptive? Here we seek a missing term that brings place and self together in any circumstance, whether premodern, modern, or postmodern. To hold that place qua place constitutes self qua self (or vice versa) is only to deepen the mystery, not to clarify it. To be as deeply ingressive in each other as they appear to be, place and self must be mediated by a third term common to both, a term that brings them together and keeps them together. What, in short, is the mediatrix of place and self?

The world-world analyzed in *Being and Time* again offers a crucial clue. The basis of the density of engagement between self and place in this world is the set of habitualities by which its rich fabric is woven. Customary actions of certain specific sorts ensure that the work-world counts as a coherent and lasting world to which recourse can be made again and again: a world that I, the worker, can continually reenter. In part, this is a matter of investing what Merleau-Ponty calls my “customary body” in such a world with its particular demands for skillful behaviors on my part. But in still larger part, it is a question of engendering, in a given such world, a habitus that draws on all my resources, not only bodily but also cultural, social, intellectual, and emotional.

I take the term habitus from Pierre Bourdieu in his *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, where it serves as a figure of the between: above all, between nature and culture, but also between consciousness and body, self and other, mechanism and teleology, determinism and freedom, even between memory and imagination. Habitus has a genius for mediation, indeed “universalizing mediation.” Here I want to propose that it is equally a middle term between place and self — and, in particular, between lived place and the geographical self. This self is constituted by a core of habitudes that incorporate and continue, at both psychical and physical levels, what one has experienced in particular places.

Habitus is not to be confused with mere routine, the sheerly habitual. True, it possesses a sedimented aspect that may induce a “hysteresis effect,” leading to lag and missed opportunity, and being slow on the uptake. But it is also improvisational and open to innovation: Bourdieu even defines habitus at one
point as an “intentionless invention of regulated improvisation.”34 His example of such improvisation is telling; it is that of “the distribution of activities and objects within the internal space of the house.”35 In short, a home-place is the scene of the regulated improvisation effected by habitus — in contrast with, say, agrarian rituals, which are “strictly regulated by customary norms and upheld by social sanctions.”36 The home-place, like Heidegger’s workplace, allows for innovation within regulation; it encourages moving around freely in its ambiance, facilitating bricolage and other forms of improvising within the limited resources of a given place and its contents. And it is thanks to such open-ended habitual action within placial constraints that there occurs “the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning (sens) of practices and the world.”37 This world is ineluctably a place-world.

Although Bourdieu does not invoke place specifically, it is everywhere present in his discussion of habitus, indeed at both ends of the quasi-diachronic model he proposes in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. It is there at the start as the scene of incultation, the place of instruction that embodies “the structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g., the material conditions characteristic of a class condition).”38 Among these material conditions of existence are surely the concrete places in which members of a given class reside and which constitute “a particular type of environment.” And place is there at the later point when a given habitus has been fully formed and is continually reenacted in similar circumstances, that is, when durable dispositions are “lastingly subjected to the same conditioning, and hence placed in the same material conditions of existence.”39 A given habitus is always enacted in a particular place and incorporates the regularities inherent in previous such places — all of which are linked by a habitual bond. It does not matter that the bond itself is often unconscious, “without explicit reason or signifying intent.”40 Indeed, its very status as *taken for granted* is what allows it to be all the more effective in its operative force. Prominent among things taken for granted is the *implacement of habitus itself*, its placial bearing as it were: a particular place gives to habitus a familiar arena for its enactment, and the lack of explicit awareness of that place as such, its very familiarity, only enhances its efficacy as a scene in which it is activated. Such a place (to adopt Bourdieu’s Gallic formula) “goes without saying because it comes without saying.”41

And the same is true for the self in all this. Its enduring interests and proclivities are incorporated into habitudes — interests and proclivities not separate from its social and historical milieu but individuated, given a personal tonality by way of incorporation into the self. If this were not to happen, the self would be a merely ephemeral entity, the creature of every passing circumstance; in fact, it has layers that are as durationally deep as the places it finds itself in are spatially thick: this is Bergson’s point in positing a *moi profond* that is not subject to the usual chronometric time but the source of a distinctive non-
numerable temporality: *durée pure.* Here we have to do with the temporality of habitus, whose lasting dispositions require the kind of generous outlay of time that duration alone can provide.

Habit is mediational in its capacity to bring together the placiality of its ongoing setting and the temporality of its recurrent reenactment. Despite Kant’s dogmatic effort to keep time out of geography and to confine it to history, whenever the geographical subject is at stake, time and history alike reenter geographical consideration. They do so most effectively in the form of habitus, which is as ineluctably temporal as it is placial in its formation and consolidation.

Thus the very idea of habitus leads us to merge what Kant wanted to keep strictly apart: history and geography. This is all the more the case if the schemes operative within habitades are placial as well as temporal. As they must be if habitus is truly to mediate between place (primarily but not exclusively spatial) and the self (primarily but not only temporal). The generativity of habitudinal schemes is at once placial and temporal, and because of this double-sidedress, the geographical subject is able to insinuate himself or herself all the more completely into the place-world. Were it not so, were habitus exclusively one or the other, this subject would be schizoid within and alienated without, unable to complete the cycle that place and the self continually reconstitute thanks to the habitudinal basis that they share. Such a subject would be precisely the self-riven early modern subject described by Descartes and Locke in their tendentious descriptions of human selfhood.

A corollary of this last line of thought is that if places can become thinned-out in certain historical moments such as our own, this can only mean that these places have begun to lose the habitudinal density whereby they are implicated within the selves who experience them. The attenuation is primarily of the habitus linking places and selves — or more exactly, of the placial and temporal schemes that generate various customary ways of being in the place-world. The consequence can only be a dessication of both self and place, the diminishing of both, a common failure to find “a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions [that] makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks.” This doubly denuded circumstance, this diminution of habitudinal thickness, is a situation of less with less, less place, less self. This is an inversion of a positively compensatory logic of more with more: more place, more self. If the thinning-out is this inversion itself and not the prelude to a reinvestment in place and self, then we are left with the sobering prospect of a redoubled loss: loss of place, loss of self.

**From Habitus to Habitation**

Promising and suggestive as is the notion of habitus when transposed from social anthropology to geography, Bourdieu’s conception needs to be expanded
in one important direction if it is to fully accomplish its role as mediatrix of place and self. As composed of internalized and sedimented schemes, and as constantly subject to hysteresis, habitus becomes deeply buried within the self as if it were an abiding possession — as is signified by Bourdieu’s descriptive terms “durable,” “lasting,” “predisposed,” and “matrix.” Reinforcing this tendency to contain habitus, to alienate it from its own improvisational powers, is Bourdieu’s claim that, as something taken for granted, it has nothing to do with the reproduction of “lived experiences.” Instead of being the expression of subjects’ intentions, the habitus is something “automatic and impersonal, significant [but] without intending to signify.” Recognizable in these claims is Bourdieu’s effort to distance himself from phenomenology.

But in fact we do act on the basis of habitus, and action is something that is both lived (i.e., consciously experienced) and intentional (i.e., involves an aim even if this is not explicitly formulated). It is the actional dimension that needs to be added to Bourdieu’s analysis. The value or virtue of a given habitus resides in the actuality of its enactment, not in its being a solidified deposition of past actions or a mere disposition to future actions. Whatever its antecedent history and subsequent fate, a habitus is something we continually put into action; and we do so, moreover, by means of concrete bodily behaviors that follow out the plans and projects of a self who actively intends to do something in the very “commonsense world” that is the product of “the orchestration of habitus.” Given that this world presents itself to us as a layout of places, the activation of habitus expresses an intentional and invested commitment to the place-world. Even if it is the internalization of social practices by way of origin, in its actual performance a given habitus is a reaching out to place.

The primary way in which the geographical subject realizes this commitment to place is by means of habitation. I am taking habitation in a sense capacious enough to include nomadic life as well as settled dwelling. Either way, the self relates to the place of habitation by means of concerted bodily movements that are the embodiment of habitudinal schemes, their explicitation and exfoliation in the inhabited place-world. In the word habitation, moreover, we hear not only living somewhere and not just the concretization of habitus but, more particularly, the active root of habitation itself, namely, habere, Latin for “to have, to hold.” Both of these root verbs are performative and transitive in character and thus adumbrate the ongoing engagement that is always at stake in the place/self cycle, especially in its habitational modes. When I inhabit a place — whether by moving through it or staying in it — I have it in my actional purview. I also hold it by virtue of being in its ambiance; first in my body as it holds on to the place by various sensory and kinesthetic means, then in my memory as I hold it in mind — a mind, moreover, that includes such nonmentalistic things as language, body memory, and habitudes themselves. This is how the durability of habitus is expressed: by my active holding on to a situation so as to prolong what I experience beyond the present moment.
Thus the *in* of *inhabitation* is not Aristotle's *in* of containment; it is the active *in* of going *into*, holding *on to*, and often eventuates in moving *out of*.\(^{50}\) The Aristotelian *in* here gives way to the Heideggerian *ex*, “out of”: a prefix we hear equally in “ex-perience” and in “ex-stasy.” Heidegger’s concept of dwelling, for example, is that of an active taking hold, a reaching *out*, a sparing and preserving, a being *on* earth that implies action on its surface, a going in and out of places on this surface.\(^{51}\)

In the end, we need to do justice both to habitus and to habitation. Geographical being is a matter of what Edmund Husserl liked to call “activity in passivity” — the activity of habitation and the passivity of habitus. If habitus represents a movement from the externality of established customs and norms to the internality of durable dispositions, habitation is a matter of re-externalization — of taking the habitus that has already been acquired and enacting it anew in the place-world. Just as there can be no habitus without the preexisting places of history and society, so there would be no habitation without the habitudes that make implantation possible for a given subject.\(^{52}\) Thus we must acknowledge the importance of intentionality and lived experience and an active assumption of stances within the world of place, whether these stances be central or marginal vis-à-vis a given society.\(^{53}\) This world is not to be confused with the realm of determinate history and collective sociality, even though both of the latter certainly influence and shape it. It is a genuine “thirddspace,” to adopt Edward Soja’s suggestive term for what I prefer to call “place-world,” a world that is not only perceived or conceived but actively lived. As Soja maintains, such space, such a world, is at once social and historical — and, equally, spatial. The spatiality is a lived spatiality: which is what Bourdieu neglects and Soja celebrates in his “real-and-imagined” experiences of Los Angeles.\(^{54}\)

**Ingoing and Outgoing Body**

What, then, is the vehicle of this lived and lively thirddspace that is neither simply material nor sheerly mental in character, a domain that we find and experience both actively and passively, both through habitation and habitude? The vehicle of being-in-place is the *body*. The body is indispensable here not just as a “practical operator” of habitudinal schemes or as the “body schema” that is the format or receptacle of such schemes.\(^{55}\) Nor is it only a question of what I have referred to above as “concerted bodily movements that are the embodiment of habitudinal schemes.” The body’s role is much more basic. In matters of place, as Henri Lefebvre claims, “the body serves both as point of departure and as destination.”\(^{56}\) But how can something that is normally beneath our notice be the pivot of the place-world?

It is the pivot in at least two ways, which I shall label “outgoing” and “incoming.”
1. Outgoing. The lived body goes out to meet the place-world. It does so in myriad ways, including highly differentiated and culturally freighted ways such as racial or class or gender identity, the focus of so many recent writings on the body. But it goes out in one primary way in which all more particular ways share: I refer to the “spatial framework” whereby it links up most pervasively with the place-world. By means of this framework, the three inherent axes of the body, each defined by a binary opposition (i.e., up/down, front/back, right/left), lead into the primary dimensions of any given place (i.e., verticality, frontality, and horizontality) as well as the implicit directionality of that place (e.g., upward or downward, forward or backward, verging to the right or to the left). It is not a matter of sheer fit—as if body and place were each, in advance, already fully formed, such that they would cohere like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. (This way lies Aristotle’s container model once again.) Neither body nor place is a wholly determinate entity; each continually evolves, and precisely in relation to the other. The place-world is energized and transformed by the bodies that inhabit it, while these bodies are in turn guided and influenced by this world’s inherent structures. The dialectic between the two is so subtle that our lived sense is often that body and place come already suited for each other and that we simply belong to our current place-world and it belongs to us; yet this mutual suitability is in fact a hard-won and precarious accomplishment that includes resistance as well as agreement in its evolution.

2. Incoming. But the body not only goes out to reach places; it also bears the traces of the places it has known. These traces are continually laid down in the body, being sedimented there, and thus becoming formative of its specific somatography. A body is shaped by the places it has come to know and that have come to it—come to take up residence in it, by a special kind of placial incorporation that is just as crucial to human experience as is the interpersonal incorporation so central to classical Freudian theory. Furthermore, places are themselves altered by our having been in them. As Elizabeth Grosz says, “The City is made and made over into the simulacrum of the body, and the body, in its turn, is transformed, ‘citified,’ urbanized as a distinctively metropolitan body.”

It is the latter action designated by Grosz—whereby the body is in effect placialized—that I am designating as “incoming.” Moreover, the coming in of places into the body, their inscription there, is a matter of both tenacity and subjection.

a. Tenacity. Places come into us lastingly; once having been in a particular place for any considerable time—or even briefly, if our experience there has been intense—we are forever marked by that place, which lingers in us indefinitely and in a thousand ways, many too attenuated to specify. The inscription is not of edges or outlines, as if place were some kind of object; it is of the whole brute presence of the place. What lingers most powerfully is this presence and, more particularly, how it felt to be in this presence; how it felt to be
in the Crazy Mountains that summer, how I sensed the Lower East Side during January. Proust points out that the essence of a place can be compressed into a single sensation that, being reawakened, can bring the place back to us in its full vivacity. In his own example, the feeling of a paving-stone underfoot somewhere in France evokes just how it felt to be in the foyer of St. Mark’s Cathedral in Venice—a foyer whose floor is lined with stones of similar unevenness.61 There is an impressionism of place by which the presence of a given place remains lodged in our body long after we have left it; this presence is held within the body in a virtual state, ready to regain explicit awareness when the appropriate impression or sensation arises.

b. Subjection. In contrast with Kant’s view that we construct space by a formal transcendental activity, we are not the masters of space but prey to it; we are subjects of place or, more exactly, subject to place. Such subjection ranges from docility (wherein we are the mere creatures of a place, at its whim and in its image) to appreciation (by which we enjoy being in a place, savoring it) to change (whereby we alter ourselves as a function of having been in a certain place). In every case, we are still, even many years later, in the places to which we are subject because (and to the exact extent that) they are in us. They are in us—indeed, are us—thanks to their in-corporation into us by a process of somatic localization whose logic is yet to be discerned. They constitute us as subjects. To be Homo geographicus is to be such a subject. To be (a) subject to place is to be what we are as an expression of the way a place is. The body is the primary vehicle of such expression, and precisely in Leibniz’s sense of a condensed and often tacit representation: the body expresses its place-world as a monad expresses the universe. Such expression is tantamount to deep reflection: in its subjection to place, a body “reflects its region.”62

Thanks to the inscriptive tenacity and expressive subjection of the body, places are embedded in us; they become part of our very character, what we enact and carry forward. Neither habitus nor habitation, taken alone, captures completely this factor of persistence of place in body. Habitus is the socially encoded core of our bodily self; habitation is the activist commitment of the same self; but to such socialism and activism we need to add a third ingredient, idiolocalism. Where habitus internalizes the collective subject of customary and normative structure, and habitation calls for the intentional subject of concerted action, idiolocality invokes the subject who incorporates and expresses a particular place, its idios, what is “peculiar” in both senses of this Greek word. And the bearer of idiolocality is none other than the body, the proper subject of place. Only such a subject can be subject to place in its idiosyncrasy; only this subject can inscribe the peculiarities of place in its very flesh, keeping them there in a state of Parathaltung, a condition of readiness to reappear at the flash of a mere impression.63

In the end, we do not have three subjects here—any more than Soja or Lefebvre would maintain that we have three separate spaces to contend with in
their trialectic typologies. There is only one subject of place, one body-subject who experiences, expresses, and deals with place by means of habitus, habitation, and idiolocalization. Place is shared out among these three modalities; it is a matter of “the betweenness of place,” in Entrikin’s striking phrase, which I here interpret as the pervasiveness of place, its permeation into every crevice of the body-subject in its habitual, habitational, and idiolocal modalities. Just as Entrikin argues that we need not make an exclusionary choice between existential and naturalistic conceptions of place but should address both “from a point in between” that does not exclude either, so I would maintain that the three aspects of the body-in-place I have singled out should be treated inclusively, without any forced choice having to be made between them. We owe no less to place and to the body that at once bears and transforms it.

The Landscape in All This

To pursue what it means to be *Homo geographicus* is to be led, therefore, to the body in at least the three modalities I have attempted to describe. And by the same token it is to be led back to the self. The self of the place/self cycle from which we began is what Barbara Hooper calls a “body/self.” Only such a self can be implaced; there is no subject of place except as embodied. Locke is here doubly undone: personal identity entails body (and not just consciousness) as well as a body-in-place (rather than an unimplaced self). The body is the heft of the self that is in place, whose very “extensity” calls for a massive and thick subject to be equal to the demanding task of existing in the place-world.

Just as there is no implaced self except as a body/self, there is no place without such a self. There may well be space and location in the absence of an embodied self, which is only contingently connected to their presence. But in the presence of place there can be no subject other than a corporeal subject capable of possessing habitus, undertaking habitation, and bearing the idiolocality of place itself. This is the concrete self of the hearth, not the disembodied occupant of the cosmos.

The body comes first and is even first among equals when it comes to philosophical (and specifically phenomenological) meditations on geography. Yet the body is not the last word concerning an expanded sense of the geographical self. Requisite as well is landscape, and I want to end with some brief observations on this basic term so familiar to contemporary cultural geographers, thanks again to the seminal work of Yi-Fu Tuan, as well as J. B. Jackson, W. G. Hoskins, Edward Relph, Denis Cosgrove, and others. (Philosophers are natural predators on what is self-evident to others — not so as to undermine what is obviously true but in order to show the sometimes unsuspected complications and implications of the obvious itself. This is what I have been doing with body and will now attempt to do, much more cursorily, with landscape.)

If it is true to say that the geographical self is deepened by the body — drawn
down into it—it is equally true to say that place is *broadened* in landscape. As Relph writes, “Landscape is both the context for places and an attribute of places.” In fact, body and landscape are the concretization and exfoliation, respectively, of the initially indefinite dyad of self and place. For this latter dyad is abstract as it stands—as much as is the Pythagorean indeterminate dyad (*aiostos dyas*) of same and other, like and unlike, odd and even. The empty armature of place-cum-self needs to be fleshed out, and in two opposed but complementary directions: downward into body and outward into landscape. I say “needs to be” because both body and landscape are so deeply ingredient in the experience of the human subject as to pass unnoticed for the most part. The presence of the body is “pre-reflective,” as Merleau-Ponty liked to say; the surrounding landscape is mostly “invisible,” as Erwin Strauss has argued, a matter of “spirit” in Relph’s word. All the more reason, then, to bring such factors into our reflective awareness—to make them as palpable as possible. To do so is to take a crucial step toward a geography that is responsive to the material conditions of the place-world: a geography so diversely enlivened by the writings of Yi-Fu Tuan.

Landscape is a cusp concept; it serves to distinguish place and space (whose difference I have taken for granted until now), being the point of their most salient difference. There is no landscape of space, though there is landscape of both place and region. It is important to stress this difference, since it is easy to think of landscape as a mere middle term between place and space—as the transition between the two. In fact, it stands between cosmos and hearth. Phrases like “wide open spaces” that we apply unthinkingly to landscape only confuse the issue. But just as thinned-out places do not merge into space, so an open landscape does not fade into space. A landscape may indeed be vast; it can contain an entire region, thus a very large set of places; yet it will never become space. No matter how capacious a landscape may be, it remains a congeries or a composition of places, their intertangled skein. It may constitute a place-world but never a universe, that is, space as an endless, infinitized totality. Once again, the difference is categorical. Landscape is a detotalized totality of places.

The ontological difference between place and space is nowhere more evident than in the fate of a primary feature of landscape, its *horizon*. Every landscape has a horizon, yet space never does. As Strauss says tellingly, “In a landscape we are enclosed by a horizon; no matter how far we go, the horizon constantly goes with us. Geographical space has no horizon.” The horizon is an arc wherein a given landscape comes to an end—an end of visibility, of presence, of availability. A place per se has no horizon, only an enclosure or perimeter. Only when places are concatenated in a landscape is there anything like a horizon, which is the undelimited limit, or better the *boundary*, for the landscape as a whole. As a boundary, the horizon does not merely close off the landscape; it opens it up for further exploration, that is, for bodily ingestion. As Heidegger puts it: “A boundary is not that at which something stops but,
as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. That is why the concept is that of horismos, that is, the horizon [as] the boundary. Hence we can apply to horizon the same term by which Aristotle describes the limit of a place: the surround. The horizon is the boundary that surrounds the grouping of places making up a given landscape. The outward movement of landscape — a movement out beyond any particular place and beyond any body in that place — reaches its (nonmetric) end in the horizon.

Other features of landscape include its sensuous display — that is, the panoply of features sensed on its surface that make it into a variegated scene of perception and action — and its atmosphere, the combination of air and light that gives to a landscape its special diffuseness or “glow.” Ingredient as well is its ground — the subtending layer that need not be earth but can be sea or even asphalt — on which the concrete things of a given landscape repose; where “things” may be humanly constructed as well as engendered by nature. I first described these various factors in a discussion of “wild places,” and it is significant that they hold up as descriptive terms of landscape in general, whether this latter be wild or cultivated. But wilderness remains paradigmatic for the outreach of landscape, its openness, its uncontrollability — even as a cityscape is emblematic of dense historicity, intentional order, cultural diversity, and social complexity. The extensity and power of landscape may be such that all we can do is to glance at it, take parts of it in, and let the rest go.

A landscape is nothing if not expansive. Where the body characteristically draws in the place-world around it — ingests it in schematized bodily behavior and in lingering body memories — the landscape draws out the same place-world, often to its utmost limit. It is rare, if not impossible, to experience an entirely isolated place: a place without relation to any other place, without imbrication in a region. Landscape is the capacious scene wherein the coalescence of places in a given region arises; it is the matrix of places without us, hence the antipode of habitus as the matrix of schemes within us. It is the arena in which cosmos and hearth, otherwise such disparate terms, connect and animate each other. As such, it shows hearth and cosmos to be not merely dichotomous but ultimately continuous with each other.

“In a landscape,” says Straus, “we always get to one place from another place,” echoing the first epigraph of this essay: “It was to satisfy man’s curiosity concerning the differences of the world from place to place that geography developed as a subject of popular interest.” The curiosity to which Hawthorne refers is a curiosity about landscape, for only in a coherent and concatenated landscape can we go from place to place, whether this be on land or sea or even in the air. Only in the generous embrace of landscape can we go from hearth to cosmos and then, having become cosmopolitan, return to hearth once more. Landscape is the transitional domain that links cosmos and hearth, place and space, self and other.
In short summation: landscape and the body are the effective epicenters of the geographical self. The one widens out into vistas of the place-world—all the way to the horizon and beyond it to the beckoning cosmos—while the other literally incorporates this same world and acts upon it. Without landscape, we would be altogether confined to the peculiarities of a particular place, its insistent idiocentrism, its hemmed-in hearth; without the body, even this one place would pass us by without leaving a mark on us, much less inspire us to act toward it in novel ways or to transcend it toward a more extensive cosmic whole. But because we have both body and landscape, place and self alike are enriched and sustained, enabling us to become enduring denizens of the place-world to which we so fately belong.

Notes

3. Ibid., 33; emphasis added.
4. Ibid., 28 (in diagram). At p. 34 Sack says that “Space is coextensive with nature and is a foundation of the universe.”
5. Ibid., 265 n. 7. Another testimony to the priority of space is found at p. 98: “the loops composing place are all variants of the same relation—space. Each loop simply reworks space so that it can engage material from that realm.”
6. The first statement is at ibid., 265 n. 7; the second at 31.
7. The complete statement is “Perhaps [place] is the first of all things.” This is cited by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, trans. S. Sambursky, in The Concept of Place in Late Neoplatonism (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982), 37. Archytas, a neo-Pythagorean, lived and wrote in the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C.
8. For this contrast, see especially David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pt. 3, and table 4.1, where modernity is encapsulated as “becoming/epistemology/regulation/urban renewal” and postmodernity as “being/ontology/deregulation/urban revitalization/place.”
9. Sack’s working premise is that “at the most general level, place integrates nature and culture” (Homo Geographicus, 166 n. 13). Not every kind of place can do this: not, for example, “secondary place,” which is merely “the distribution of certain things in space” (ibid., 32; emphasis added). But “primary place” does bring nature and culture together, and it does so “when place, and not only the things in it, is a force—when it influences, affects, and controls” (ibid.). Primary place influences, affects, and controls because of the presence of human intention and meaning, which convert secondary places into primary places—the very places we inhabit and explore and enjoy.
10. Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), 83. Tuan and Sack are by no means the only geographers to engage in this paradigm. Compare Pred: place “always involves an appropriation and transformation of space and nature” (Allen Pred, “Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time-Geography of Becoming Places,” Annual of the Association of American Geographers 74, no. 2 [1984]: 279).
11. Another such misconception is the confinement of place to the experience of human beings alone. When Sack claims that “primary places involve [only] human actions and intentions” (Homo Geographicus, 32), he engages in an unduly anthropocentric way of thinking that undervalues the fact that other animals (and even plants and rocks) have their